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Cooking oil is known as an essential commodity in Indonesia. Having such an important 
role, the Indonesian government often interfered the cooking oil market to assure its price 
remain low. To do so, the government uses a subsidy policy as one of its instruments. A 
dynamic duopoly model is applied to evaluate the impact of subsidies given the structure 
of the industry. Estimation results suggest an evidence of both an increase in the 
consumer surplus but a decrease in aggregate welfare due to market power. A possible 
reason is proposed, but, in order to obtain a clear explanation, further research is required. 
 
 




1.  Introduction 
 
Palm oil industry is known as an important industry in the Indonesian economic, hence 
there has been a high degree of government interventions in this industry. The main 
purpose of these interventions has been to ensure that the cooking oil price remains 
stable.  To do so, subsidies are imposed either in the upstream industry, the Crude Palm 
Oil (CPO) industry, or in the downstream industry, the cooking oil industry. Subsidies 
were given when the domestic market price significantly increased as the demand 
increased, such during festive seasons.  Usually the amount of subsidies was about 25 to 
30 per cent of the market price. CPO subsidy was distributed to the cooking oil refineries, 
while the cooking oil subsidy was either indirectly distributed to the end consumer 
through retail distributor directed by the government, or directly distributed to a target 
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group—people that were considered poor—through market operations arranged by the 
government or private companies.  
 
The subsidies expenses could either guarantee by the government or CPO and cooking oil 
producers.  Who and how much of the subsidies should be guaranteed by each of them 
have been a long debate.  On one hand, producers argue that subsidies increase their cost 
of production, hence decrease their profits. On the other hand, the structural conditions of 
the industry raise concern about the existence of market power. With market power, 
producers enjoy supra rather than normal profit; hence subsidies would not really 
decrease their profit.  To analyse such possibilities, this paper is designed to measure 
market power and the impact of subsidies to the Indonesian palm oil industry. .  
 
This paper is organised as follows.  In the next section, the Indonesian palm oil industry 
will be described.  Then the model will be introduced in section 3.  Section 4 shows the 
data and procedures used in estimating the model, followed by the analysis of the results.  




2.  Overview of the palm oil industry 
 
The palm oil industry is a fresh fruit bunches (output from the oil palm/ Elais guineensis 
sp. tree) based industry which produces a huge range of commodities. Among the various 
commodities, cooking oil—which is an essential commodity in Indonesia— appears to be 
the most important one to the Indonesian economic sector. From 1993 to 2003, on 
average, the cooking oil industry accounted for 75 per cent of palm oil usage (CIC 1994, 
1997, 2003, 2004). In addition for being the essential commodity, the importance of the 
palm oil industry in the Indonesian economy arises from at least two other conditions. 
First, CPO is one of the main contributors to Indonesia’s export revenue. Second, the 
industry employs a large number of workers. This is important in Indonesia where a high 
unemployment rate is still a problem, especially since the economic crisis.  
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In Indonesia, palm oil producers can be divided into three different groups: the 
government, private companies and smallholders groups. The government group 
comprises 10 government estates with a single Joint Marketing Office.  The private group 
is dominated by 10 conglomerates, but unlike the government estate, they do not have a 
single marketing office. On average, the size of a government or private group individual 
plantation is approximately 10,000–25,000 ha, and it is usually a part of larger plantation 
estate ranging from 100,000 to 600,000 ha (Casson 2000). Both groups appear to be 
highly vertically integrated, have good access to capital markets, new technologies and 
information. However, government estates tend to be more bureaucratic, less adaptable to 
changes and consequently less efficient (Barlow et al. 2003, pp. 10-13; van Gelder 2004, 
pp. 31-45; LONSUM 2005).  
 
Smallholders do not have any joint marketing associations, and have area less than 200 
ha. In 2001, the government helps smallholders to establish their own association called 
Indonesian Association of Palm Oil Farmers (Assosiasi Petani Kelapa Sawit Indonesia/ 
APKASINDO).  It accommodates some of the smallholders’ inspiration, but this 
association is unlikely deal with marketing arrangements. Together with the perishable 
characteristic of the Fresh Fruit Bunches and lack of processing facilities, smallholders 
appear to be price takers. Therefore, although the total size of smallholders has reached 
40 per cent of market share, we could argue that they are effectively a (high-cost) 
competitive fringe. Hence, this group is not considered as one of the strategic groups in 




3.  The model 
 
 
The model is based on Karp and Perloff (1993), who apply the state-space game model to 
measure symmetric duopolists’ market power in the coffee export market.  In the 
Indonesian palm oil industry, the duopolists represent the government and private groups. 
These groups are unlikely to be identical:  the government group appears to be more 
bureaucratic, less responsive to change and less productive than the private group.     4
Therefore, the symmetric assumption of the model is relaxed. In each period, duopolists 
choose the rate of their output as the control variable. Being a perennial crop means that 
firms run a long-run production process. In the long-run, inputs such as land or plant 
capacity are no longer fixed and could be changed or adjusted.  These inputs are held 
constant in the short-run due to the high cost of adjustment.  The greater the size or speed 
of adjustment, the higher the costs should be expended.  Therefore, firms are assumed to 
make changes or adjustments gradually.   
 
The objective function of firm i is to maximise its discounted profit stream 
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whereδ is the discount factor, t p  is the linear inverse demand, ( ) i ct is the constant 
marginal production cost, it q  is the output, and 
2
i
ii t i t uu
θ
γ ε ⎛⎞ + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
  is a convex adjustment 
cost.   i γ  and  i θ  are the adjustment cost parameters,  it it it uq q ε ε − ≡ −  is the rate of 
adjustment, and ε  is the three-year length of maturation period.  () tt qg tG q ε − =+ is the 
adjustment system, where  ( ) gt is a column vector, and G  is a 2x2 matrix with elements 
ij G  () ,1 , 2 ij = .   
 
The adjustment cost parameter θ  and market power index v are calculated by providing 
the estimates of the slope of the adjustment system G  matrix, elements of which are  ij G  , 
and the slope of the inverse demand b .  The solution needs to satisfy three properties, 
which in this duopoly case are: 
(a) the system needs to be stable:  11 22 22 GG − <+<  and  11 22 12 21 11 GG GG − <−<   
(b) the market power index needs to be interpretable:  1 1 i v − << ; and   5
(c) the adjustment cost function needs to be convex:  0 i θ > .  
Imposing these three properties using a classical approach would be extremely difficult, 
if not impossible.  However, the Bayesian approach provides a relatively easy technique 
to do so (Griffiths 1988; Karp and Perloff 1993, p. 452). Appendix 1 shows the 
estimation process, which is based on Chalfant et al. (1991).  
 
Utilise the recursive principle, assuming 0 it γ = ,  1 ε =  and constant marginal costs, the 
discounted profit stream can be re-written as  
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, the maximisation of the 
discounted profit stream firm i will be: 
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and  the current price will be 
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While if  1 i v = , the slope of marginal revenue is twice the slope of inverse demand, and 
the monopoly mark up is observed. If  1 i v = − , marginal revenue equals price, and there is 
no mark up, reflecting a competitive condition.  If  1 v = − , Equation 4 can be written as 
   6
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Changes in welfare can be illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Changes in consumer surplus 
 
 
Consumer surplus without subsidies and firms behave competitively will be 
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Using Equations 6 and 7, the change in consumer surplus caused subsidies will be 
 
Equation 8 
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4.  Estimation and Result 
 
 
The model was estimated using annual data for the period of 1968–2003. Discount rates 
and exchange rate data are from the International Finance Statistics. CPO domestic 
demand data were not available: CPO consumption data listed in the Oil World were used 
as a proxy. CPO domestic prices were constructed from two sources—the Indonesian 
Department of Agriculture and Oil World—while the crude oil coconut and palm cooking 
oil domestic prices were from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics and Suharyono (1996). 
All price data were deflated by the Indonesian Consumer Price Index data reported by the 
Indonesian Bureau of Statistics.   
 
The price of CPO, crude coconut oil, cooking oil and a dummy variable for economic 
crisis were chosen as regressors in the CPO demand function.  In addition, an interactive 
term between the price of CPO and crude coconut oil was included to capture the 
possible market power effect (Bresnahan 1982). Except for the price of CPO, all of these 
variables were treated as exogenous variables.  The price of CPO was suspected to be 
endogenously determined with the quantity of CPO through the CPO supply function.  
Therefore, the demand equation was then estimated using the instrumental variable 
technique, in which endogeneity of the CPO price was rejected by the Hausman test
 3.   
 
Three different specifications, namely the linear, the double-log and the linear-log forms 
were estimated.  In the last two forms, variables used in the adjustment systems are not 
linear, but their relationships are clearly linear. In other words, all of them state a linear 
relationship between the control  t u , or in parallel  t q , and the state  1 t q − .  They can be seen 
as types of the linear equation of motion, which specification is chosen in the theoretical 
and empirical models.  Using time series data, a unit root and cointegration tests were 
conducted in order to avoid a spurious regression. The CPO demand data need to be in 
the same order and cointegrated with all the regressors.  The Dickey–Fuller unit root test 
shows that all data are non-stationary.  
                                                 
3 The price of estate worker data, which contributes about 30 per cent of the production costs, was used as 
the instrumental variable in the Hausman test. The rationale is because the price of estate worker is 
correlated with the CPO price, as it is part of the production costs, but not with the CPO demand.   8
 
In the linear forms, the time-series data have different orders of integration, and hence 
cointegration relationships do not exist. In the double-log and linear-log forms, the time-
series data have the same orders of integration and cointegration.  However, most 
coefficients in the former were insignificant, while most of the latter were significant.  
Therefore, the linear-log form is used for the final demand equation. The Durbin–Watson 
statistic was inconclusive, and thus the LM test was used as an alternative.  The result 
shows no serial correlation in the system, and the
2 R  value is high. Results are as follows: 
 
 
Equation 9    12 4835.28 1166.55 2280 493.73 1 354.09 41.53 QP P P P P D =− − + + +  
                                     ()
***
6.05     ()
** 2.28 −    ()
*** 7.23 −        ( )
*** 7.91           ( ) 1.23       ()
** 2.04        
                                                    
2 0.98 R =              LM test, F-statistics  6.06* =  
                      *** and 
**  shows one and five per cent level of significance  
 
where  P  is the log of the domestic price of CPO, 1 P  is the log of the domestic price of 
crude coconut oil, 2 P is the log of the domestic price of palm cooking oil,D is a dummy 
variable that represents the economic crisis period of 1997–1998 (Before 1997 it is zero, 
otherwise it is one) and numbers in parentheses are t-values. Except for 2 P , all estimates 
are significant at the one or five per cent levels. The insignificant result of the coefficient 
of the price of palm cooking oil  2 P  might be explained by the government intervention in 
setting the market prices. Larson (1996, p. 18) found that the export tax changed the 
relationship between the CPO and the cooking oil prices. 
The coefficient of P  was also used to calculate the slope of the CPO inverse demand 
b (see footnote 12), which is needed to estimate the adjustment cost parameter in the next 
section.  The slope changes with the changes of CPO price P  over time.  However, even 
with a constant slope, calculation the adjustment cost parameter and the market power 
index in an asymmetric dynamic model are for complicated enough.  Therefore, for 
computational ease,  the average value of CPO price was used to calculate the constant   9
slope (Gujarati 1999, p. 263). The difference between the maximum and minimum values 
of the slope is relatively small; hence using the average value is fairly reasonable. 
 
The coefficient of P  and  1 PP were used to calculate the own price elasticity of CPO 
demand
4.  Figure 2 shows that the own price demand elasticities appear to be positive, 
indicating the nature of net price variable (Brown et al 1974). In this case, the net price 
refers to the actual price paid by the consumers, which is the CPO market price minus the 
subsidy. Due to the lack of subsidy data, the market price data used in the estimation do 
not subtract by the subsidy data; hence they are not the net price variable.  Therefore, an 
increase in the market price does not necessary means an increase in the real price paid 
by the consumers.  If in fact, the net price is actually decreased, an increase in the market 
price might lead to an increase in the quantity demanded.  Hence, a positive own price 
demand elasticity would be observed. Figure 2 also shows that the CPO elasticity 
changed significantly towards more inelastic demand, reflecting the increase in the CPO 
dominancy as the raw material for cooking oil.  
 




























































































Source: Author’s calculations. 
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The adjustment system was estimated using the SUR. With a similar argument used in 
the estimation of demand function, two different specifications, namely the linear and the 
double-log forms, were estimated. For each group, output data were regressed on the 
three year-lag of its own and the other group output data. As both of the time series level 
data are non-stationary, 
2 R  value appears to be extremely high.  Unless the time series 
data are cointegrated, the relationship between them will be spurious. The unit root test 
shows that all of the time series data are I(1), but the Johansen cointegration test result 
indicates that a cointegration relationship appears only in the double-log form. Therefore, 
it was used for the final estimation. As lagged dependent variables were included in the 
model, the Durbin–Watson test for autocorrelation is no longer applicable and needs to be 
replaced by Durbin’s h-test. The result shows that there is no autocorrelation.  Two 
dummy variables for the time of the economic crisis and the time of concessionary credit 
were also included.  Results are shown in Table 1 
 
Table 1    Estimation of the adjustment system  
  Government   Private  
Constant 0.45  0.31 
 (3.32)
***  (1.35) 
Economic crisis 1997  -0.10  0.06 
                   (-3.68)
***  (1.25) 
Concessionary credit 1986–1996  -0.04  0.17 
                 (-2.14)
**  (5.32)
*** 




Other lagged output  0.05  0.25 
 (0.89)  (2.61)
*** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.99  0.99 
Durbin–Watson 1.27  1.79 
Durbin’s h  12.07
***  3.5
*** 
Note : Numbers in parenthesis refer to t-statistics 
*** and 
** shows 1 and 5 per cent level of significance, respectively. 
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The G  matrix was constructed from coefficients of the own lagged ( ) 11 22 , GG and other 
lagged output () 12 21 , GG  of the government and private groups. All elements of the G  
matrix, except  12 G , are significant at the one per cent level.  11 G  and  22 G  are positive, 
indicating increasing growth in both the government and private output. The insignificant 
12 G  indicates a lack of response from the government group to the previous action of 
private group, while the positive  21 G  shows that the private group always accommodates 
the previous action of government group, and hence a leader–follower relationship is 
detected.   
 
While both dummy parameters of the government group are negative, those of the private 
group appear to be positive.   The difference in the credit dummy estimates might stem 
from the amount and effectiveness of the credit received by each group. The government 
and the private groups received 15 per cent and 26 per cent of the total credit, 
respectively.  While a one per cent increase in the credit boosted the government 
plantation area by 0.4 per cent, that of the private can be expand by 1.5 per cent (ADB 
1997).  On the other hand, the difference in the economic crisis dummy estimates might 
stem from the market distribution and in the efficiency of each group. During the 
economic crisis, the international–domestic CPO price ratio significantly increased, 
making exports more profitable. The government sector did not fully enjoy such a benefit 
because most of its output needed to be supplied to the domestic market. Although such a 
restriction was not imposed on the private group, a similar barrier exists from the high 
export taxes imposed during the periods of economic crisis.  However, many sellers 
appeared to smuggle their CPO to the international market, and thus enjoyed the increase 
in export values (Marks et al. 1998, pp. 53-54). At the same time, being more efficient, 
the private group may also have minimised the increase in production costs  due to the 
increase in imported input prices (Arifin et al. 1999).  
 
Using the Bayesian estimation procedure (see Appendix 1), the mean, standard deviation 
and numerical standard error (NSE) of the market power index v and the cost of 
adjustment parameter θ  were calculated. The results are shown in Table 5.4.   12
Table 2 Bayesian estimates  
Selected samples = 1310 , Probability = 0.0034  Parameters  Mean Standard  deviation  NSE 
1 θ   1.39E5 5.18E4  5E32 
2 θ   1.77E3 278.99 4.98E29 
1 v   -0.46 0.75  3.26E31 
2 v   -0.72 0.15  6.29E26 
 
Table 2 shows that jointly imposing three properties reduces the selected samples to only 
1310 out of the 200,000 replications. The standard deviation of the adjustment cost 
parameters and market power index are relatively small, but their numerical standard 
errors are very large. Therefore, the estimation of mean values of the adjustment cost 
parameters and the market power index are still used with caution.   
 
The market power indices  i v  which estimations appear to be more than -1 indicates that 
market price is higher than firms’ marginal costs.  To test this, three different scenarios 
(reflecting three different conditions in the analysis period) were simulated. Given two 
dummy variables, referring to the economic crisis and the concessionary credits, the 
period of analysis can be divided into period 1 of 1969-1985, in which  12 0 DD == ; 
period 2 of 1986-1996, in which  1 0 D =  and  2 1 D = ; and period 3 of 1997-2003, in 
which  1 1 D =  and  2 0 D = .  
 
Using the first scenario, in which  12 0 DD = = , implying no  economic crisis and 
concessionary credits, the adjustment system can be re-written as  
 
Equation 10      11 1 2 0.45 0.90 0.05 tt t qq q + =+ +  
                            21 1 2 0.31 0.25 0.70 tt t qq q + =+ +  
 
Given the results of demand function and adjustment system estimations, the difference 
between the subsidised and competitive prices faced by the government will be 
   13
Equation 11     12 0.00071 0.003233 0.000078
sc
tt t t pp q q −= − − −  
 
and that faced by the private will be 
 
Equation 12     12 0.00025 0.0002 0.001515
sc
tt t t pp q q −= − − −  
 
The relationship between  1t q  and  2t q  is obtained by combining Equations 11 and 12  
 
Equation 13    12 0.151665 0.4727 tt qq =− 
 
Substituting this into Equations 12 and 13 gives 
 
Equation 14      2 0.00120 0.001450
sc
tt t pp q −= − +   
and  
Equation 15       2 0.00028 0.0014205
sc
tt t pp q −= − −  
 
Finally, combining Equations 14 and 15 gives 
 
Equation 16    2 0.32 t q =  
 
Due to the lack of subsidy data, market price data are not the net price data and could be 
treated as the subsidised price, hence the average price  p   was then used as an 
approximation of 
s
t p  (see Figure 1).  Plug  128120.97 p =  either into Equation 14 or 15, 
gives the competitive price  128121
c
t p = . Following the same steps as in scenario 1, 
gives the same results for the competitive price in scenarios 2 and 3.  Therefore, it could 
be concluded that the competitive price 
c
t p  appears to be higher than  p .   
 
While average market price is higher than the competitive price, estimation results 
indicate that both producers still enjoy some degree of market power.  This might in part,   14
be related to the imposition of subsidies either in CPO or cooking oil prices.  With a 
subsidy, the sellers’ price might exceed the buyers’ price (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2001, 
p. 317). 
5  Due to the lack of subsidy data, the market price data used in the estimation are 
not differentiated with prices really received by the producers.  In such conditions, 
negative margins do not necessarily show a negative profit for the firm. If fact, the 
amount of subsidies are greater than the competitive and market prices margin, sellers 
would receive price higher than the competitive price and enjoy gain some degree of 
market power.  
 
The estimation result shows that the slope of demand b  is positive.  While this can be 
explained by the nature of net price variable, positive b values make competitive market 
prices higher than non competitive market prices.  Recall Equation  4  
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−+  would be positive , hence 
competitive prices would be higher than the non competitive ones. In the estimation 
process  b was calculated using the average market price  p .  i v  values were obtained 
through the estimation of firms adjustment process and were not determined by the b  
value.  The separate estimations of b  and  i v values might lead to the condition of high 
competitive price.  
 
With market power, subsidies are unlikely to have a desired effect. This can be illustrated 
in Figure 3. Suppose the price and quantity without subsidies are 
m p  and 
m Q , with 
subsidies are  p  and 
s Q , and marginal cost is mc. 
 
                                                 
5 The seller’s price refers to price being equal to the seller’s marginal cost and the buyer’s price is the same 
as the market price.   15
Figure 3   Subsidies and welfare 
 
 
Without subsidies, consumers could only receive surplus as much as OHF, whereas that 
with subsidies could be as much as OBC.  This means that subsidies increase consumer 
surplus as much as ABCE. However, the expense of subsidies ( )
ms p pQ − (which equals 
BCGH) is greater than the increase in consumer surplus.  The difference CGF indicates 
that with market power, subsidies could reduce the aggregate welfare.  
 
In Indonesia, the subsidies could be either covered by the government or the producer 
(either government or private companies).  Without subsidies, producer surplus is 
()
mm p mc Q − (see Figure 1).  If the subsidies are covered by the government and the 
government does not know the producers’ marginal cost, paying all the difference 
between the producer and the consumer prices, producers still receive prices at 
m p . In 
such a condition, the subsidy does not change the producers’ margin, and still enjoy some 
degree of market power. The producer’s surplus increase as much as ( )
ms p mc Q − .  
 
In contrast, if all of the subsidies are covered by the producers, producers receive prices 
at 
s p , hence their price-cost margin will be negative and their surplus decrease as much 
p mc =  
p  
m p  
price 
Quantity  m Q  
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as  ()
s s mc p Q − . Finally, the expenses of subsidies could also be divided between the 
government and producers.  If government expenses for subsidies are great enough to 
lead to a positive price-cost margin, producers still enjoy some degree of market power. 
Such a condition might appear in the Indonesian palm oil industry, as policy makers have 
incomplete or no information about the groups’ cost functions and the amount of 
subsidies given is unlikely to be determined by the difference between price and marginal 
costs.   
 
If producers have different marginal costs due to the difference in efficiency, the 
subsidies might provide some degree of market power to the more efficient producer. The 
efficient producer has lower marginal costs, say mc p mc ′ < < , than those who are less 
efficient.  In this case, producers still gain extra profit and enjoy market power even they 
have to cover all of the subsidies.  In fact, the public producers appear to be less efficient 
than the private companies. On average, the production costs of the government group 
were 36 per cent higher than those of the private group.
6 Therefore, in order to be 
effective, government price intervention needs to be based on the marginal cost 
information of efficient producers.  
 
In addition, subsidies would encourage the less efficient producers to remain in the 
industry. Green (1987, p. 487) suggests that there are two conditions that allow less 
efficient firms to remain in a market.  First, there are no better potential entrants. In the 
palm oil industry, this might be attributable to barriers to entry that stem from the high 
investment levels required to establish a sufficient scale of oil palm estates and CPO 
mills. In 1986 the government attempted to address this problem by providing potential 
entrants with some concessionary credits. On average, each of the private companies 
borrowed about 77 per cent of its total establishment cost and increased the oil palm 
plantation area almost seven-fold. However, after 1996 these  concessionary credits were 
no longer available (Casson 2000). This implies that the more recent entrants faced 
                                                 
6 De Fraja (1991) has used the average variable cost as the measurement of efficiency. The production cost 
of the private group is approximated by the real average costs of a firm listed in the Jakarta Future 
Exchange during 1994–2003, and that of the government groups is approximated by the real average costs 
of plantation firms surveyed by Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia during 1994–2000.    17
higher costs to entry to the industry, and hence incumbents earned persistently higher 
profits than the potential entrants.
7  If such barriers can be removed, ‘no one firm can 
succeed in the long run at earning profits that exceed costs without inducing additional 
entry’(Carlton and Perloff 2005, p. 77).  Therefore, providing potential entrants with 
similar credits—so that firms can enter with identical cost—could lead the market to a 
more competitive condition, in which no inefficient firms can survive. This implies that 
the government group would be forced to increase its efficiency to remain competitive.  
While an inefficient public firm can still improve consumer welfare by selling output at 
below its marginal costs,
8 this is obtained through a transfer from the rest of economy 
(for example, through general taxation), rather than from increasing total social welfare.  
In contrast, with low marginal costs, an efficient public firm can set a low price, forcing 
private firms to cut their price, and hence increase the total social welfare (de Fraja 1991, 
p. 315). 
 
The second condition allowing less efficient firms to remain in the market is the absence 
of competition among incumbent firms. Clarke (1983, p. 384) suggests that, in general, 
oligopolists have strong incentives to collude because they would gain profits by 
restricting their output and receiving a higher price.  However, incentives to collude are 
often offset by the problems associated with detecting cheaters on the collusive 
agreement, which stem from the uncertain market conditions. One way to reduce market 
uncertainty is by homogenising the oligopolists’ perception through a pooling 
mechanism, such as in the trade associations. Being a member of the same association 
(namely the Indonesian Palm Oil Producers Association) provides means for the 
government and private groups to improve their production or distribution processes as 
well as promoting technical or economic progress.  However, at the same time, this 
allows the groups to homogenise their perception about the market condition and to share 
information about other firms. In the absence of the competitive behaviour, both the 
public and private producers may enjoy some degree of market power.
9  
                                                 
7 Carlton and Perlof (2005) defined such a condition as the long-run barrier to entry. 
8 Being instructed to maximise the social welfare is often used as a justification for the losses in the public 
firms (de Fraja 1991, p.316). 
9 Green (1994) calls this receiving a supra-normal profit.    18
Subsidies might also lead to a decrease in the elasticity of demand (Silvestre 1993, pp. 
136-137). For example, if the demand has a straight line curve, moving down along the 
line leads to a decrease in the elasticity. Subsidies decrease prices that need to be paid by 
the consumers, hence increase quantity demanded by the consumers.  In other words, 
subsidies move down the equilibrium point along the demand curve. For normal goods, 
an increase in their market price causes consumers to shift their demand to other 
substitute goods. However, with subsidies consumers pay either the same or a slightly 
higher price, and hence their demand might remain the same or only slightly decrease.  
This implies that a ‘change’ in output price does not change or only slightly changes the 
demand, so that producers could increase price without losing a significant amount of 
demand.  This provides producers with a chance to increase price above marginal cost 
and enjoy the market power gain.   
 
To conclude, while subsidies are imposed to increase the consumers’ surplus, they might 
actually decrease the aggregate welfare due to market power.  In order to provide 
subsidies that could remove the imperfectly competitive market condition, policy makers 
need information on the marginal cost of the efficient producers.  If the amount of the 
subsidy is exactly the difference between price and costs, the competitive market price 
will be observed.  If the amount of subsidy is greater than the difference between price 
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5.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
Using a dynamic duopoly model, this study finds that producers in the Indonesian palm 
oil industry enjoy some degree of market power.  Simulating three different scenarios, the 
results also show that the average market price is lower than the competitive price, lead to 
an increase in the consumer surplus.  While such conditions seem contradictive, this 
might, in part, be explained by the existence of subsidies in this industry. Lacks of 
information about producers’ marginal costs, subsidies are unlikely imposed to decrease 
the consumer price rather than to improve the market structure. As a result, although the 
subsidies appear to help the consumers, they are in fact, lead to a decrease in the 
aggregate welfare. Moreover, subsidies could encourage the less efficient producers to 
remain in the industry.  Therefore, it is strongly recommended that before deciding how 
much to subsidy and who should guarantee the subsidy, policy makers need to have 
sufficient information, at least about the producers’ costs.   
 
To determine whether a firm does exercise market power or not is not always easy and 
practical. It is important to note that the findings of market power index suffer from low 
probability and high numerical standard errors.  This might stem from the lack of subsidy 
data. Therefore, a richer data set in the future could potentially improve the estimation 
results.  There might also be a modelling problem. Due to the indivisibility of inputs and 
discontinuity of adjustments, the model is found to be limited to a convex adjustment 
costs structure.  Thus, future research that explores more flexible structures could provide 











































ADB (1997), 'Impact evaluation study of bank operations in the industrial crops and 
agro-industry sector in Indonesia', no. IES:INO 97010, Asian Development Bank.  
 
Arifin, S., Dradjat, B., Susila, W.R. and Supriono, A. (1999), 'The impact of the 
economic crisis on development of the estate crops', Working paper no. 99.18, 
Center for Agro-Socioeconomic Research, Bogor, Indonesia.  
 
Barlow, C., Zen, Z. and Gondowarsito, R. (2003), 'The Indonesian Palm Oil Industry', Oil 
Palm Industry Economic Journal, vol. 3.  
 
Bresnahan, T.F. (1982), 'The oligopoly solution concept is identified', Economics Letters, 
vol. 10, pp. 87-92.  
 
Brown et al. (1974), 'The rising rice of physicians' services: A clarification', Review of 
economics and statistics, vol. 56, pp. 396-398.   21
 
Carlton, D.W. and Perloff, J.M. (2005), Modern Industrial Organization, 4th edn, 
Pearson, Addison Wesley, Boston.  
 
Casson, A. (2000), 'The hesitant boom:  Indonesia's oil palm sub-sector in an era of 
economic crisis and political change', Center for International Forestry Research 
(CIFOR). Bogor, Indonesia.  
 
Chalfant, J.A., Gray, R.S. and White, K.J. (1991), 'Evaluating prior beliefs in a demand 
system: the case of meat demand in Canada', American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, vol. 73, pp. 476-490.  
 
CIC (1994), Study on oil palm plantations and marketing of Indonesian palm oil, 1994, 
Jakarta.  
 
CIC (1997), Studi tentang industri dan perkebunan kelapa sawit Indonesia, 1997, 
Jakarta.  
 
CIC (2003), Studi tentang industri dan pemasaran minyak goreng (kelapa sawit, kelapa 
dan nabati lainnya), Jakarta.  
 
CIC (2004), Study and directory on palm oil industry in Indonesia, Jakarta.  
 
Clarke, R.N. (1983), 'Collusion and incentives for information sharing', Bell Journal of 
Economics, vol. 14, pp. 383-394.  
 
de Fraja, G. (1991), 'Efficiency and privatisation in imperfectly competitive industries', 
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 39, pp. 311-321.  
Green, C. (1987), 'Industrial organization paradigms, empirical evidence, and the 
economic case for competition policy', Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 20, 
pp. 482-505.  
 
Griffiths, W.E. (1988), 'Bayesian econometrics and how to get rid of those wrong signs', 
Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, vol. 56, pp. 36-56.  
 
Gujarati, D. (1999), Essential of Econometrics-second edition, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (various issues-e), 'Planted areas of annual crop by 
province, type and condition of crop', in Statistics of Plantation Estate, 
Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta.  
 
International Financial Statistics (2006), Country Tables, International Financial 
Statistics, Available: http://ifs.apdi.net.ezproxy.library.usyd.edu.au/imf/ 
 
Karp, L.S. and Perloff, J.M. (1993), 'A dynamic model of oligopoly in the coffee export 
market', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 75, pp. 448-457.    22
 
Larson, D.F. (1996), 'Indonesia's palm oil subsector', World Bank, Washington, DC.  
 
LONSUM (2005), 'Annual Report 2004', LONSUM, Jakarta.  
 
Marks, S.V., Larson, D.F. and Pomeroy, J. (1998), 'Economics effect of taxes on exports 
of palm oil products', Bulletin of Indonesian Economics Studies, vol. 34, pp. 37-
58.  
 
Oil World (2004), 'Oil World Annual 2004', ISTA Mielke GmbH, Hamburg,Germany.  
 
Pindyck, R.S. and Rubinfeld, D.L. (2001), Microeconomics, 5th edn, Upper Saddle River 
: Prentice Hall.  
 
Silvestre, J. (1993), 'The market-power foundations of macroeconomic policy', Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 31, pp. 105-141.  
 
Suharyono (1996), Analisis dampak kebijakana ekonomi pada komoditi minyak sawit 
dan hasilindustri yang megggunakan bahan baku minyak sawit di Indonesia., 
Bogor Agricultural Institute, Bogor.  
 
van Gelder, J.W. (2004), 'Greasy palms: European buyers of Indonesian palm oil', 
Friends of Earth, London.    23














Market power index 
Adjustment cost 
parameter
Selection 
Selected 
samples 
Weighting 
Importance 
sampling 
Results 